High Rates Among Various Ethnic Backgrounds - 1060 Words

Healthcare disparities exist at higher rates among various ethnic backgrounds as well as individuals with disabilities. Although receiving good healthcare should be a privilege, statistics have shown that social determinants such as poor education, low income, limited access to quality care, as well as environmental factors have contributed to healthcare disparities. If society could improve barriers like health education, communication, and healthcare cost, quality healthcare could be successfully provided to every person. Different levels of wellness, the underutilization of available care, and outcomes of illnesses and injuries are all concepts that define health disparities, (Buchbinder Shanks, 2012). The social injustice of class inequalities directly affects health and education all over the world. There are two models of human behavior that, when properly addressed, could positively decrease the imbalance in society. The individual model is one of two models of human beha vior that could be considered a strain on health and education disparities. An individual’s values, beliefs, traits and skills are characteristics of the individual model. Children who come from impoverished areas may not possess the skills or language abilities needed to receive the appropriate levels of academic achievement. Lower income areas have a higher number of non-completion of high school youth. Additionally, important academic resources such as textbooks, technology, andShow MoreRelatedCauses And Treatment Of Cervical Cancer1335 Words   |  6 Pagesthird most commonly diagnosed cancer and the fourth leading cause of cancer death in females worldwide with over 527,000 new cases 1,2 and perhaps the second most common cancer among women in the third world countries 3-5 It accounts for 9% of the total new cancer cases and 8% (more than 265,000) of the total cancer deaths among females.1,2 More than 80% of these cases and deaths occur in developing countries.1-4 Although cancer of the cervix is known to be a preventable cancer, it still remains oneRead MoreAn Estimate Of The Total Population895 Words   |  4 Pagescompleted some form high school diploma or equivalent, 194,460 or 59.9% had post secondary certificate, diploma or degree, and 52,050 or 16% had completed neither high school nor any postsecondary certificates, diplomas or degrees. Ethnic background: According to 2011 National Household Survey, 31,245 (8.1%) of the total population are foreign-born (immigrants), 348,350 (90.6%) are Canadian-born (non-immigrants) and 4,735 (1.2%) are non-permanent residents. Most frequently reported ethnic origins were CanadianRead MoreRace And Ethnicity : The Primary Care Provider792 Words   |  4 PagesRace and Ethnicity The primary care provider needs to consider the patient s race and ethnic group when treating diabetes and discussing health issues such as obesity. Literature reveals that certain ethnic groups respond better to selected medications, like the drug Metformin, in the treatment of diabetes (Woo Wynne, 2013 p. 1096-97). Thus, the caregiver must be knowledgeable about all medications used in the treatment of diabetes. Asking the patient both direct and open-end questions duringRead MoreAuthor Lives In Mississauga City, Canada. And Her Background1736 Words   |  7 Pages Author lives in Mississauga city, Canada. And her background is from one of the ethnic minority. In Canada Ontario is one of the populated provinces. Mississauga is situated in the Southern Ontario and 6th most populated city in the Canada and the part of the Greater Toronto area and lies on the shores of Lake Ontario. The city has a 713,443 population (Statistics Canada, 2011 Census). Toronto is the main destination for migrants to Canada and Mississauga city has a multicultural population. Read MoreEconomy and History of Conflict in Myanmar Essay867 Words   |  4 Pagesabundant natural resources, a relatively high literacy rate, absence of population pressure and a rigid caste system, and a relatively high social status given to women in the society† (Than and Tan 1990:1). However, political instability following independence had led to the collapse of the Burmese economy in the mid-1980s. The GDP growth rate of 5.5 percent from 1985 to 1986 can be starkly compared to that of 1989 to 1990, which showed negative growth rates. For instance, earning from foreign tradeRead MoreHow Can Education Be A Solution For Increase Cultural Competency?1386 Words   |  6 Pagesespecially as there continues to be growth in the minority population. Cultural competencies must be meaningfully incorporated into the curriculum to show student for how important it is for their community to be able to help people of different ethnic backgrounds (Knox and Haupt, 2015). Cultural com petency can be incorporated into education by having students learn through definitions, discussions, and training modules. Students in a dynamic process incorporate experiences such as internships, studyRead MoreThe Veterans Of Foreign Wars Organization Essay1187 Words   |  5 Pagessacrifice they have made for this great country. The VFW of Rapid City, South Dakota is one of many locations in the United States. They offer many resources to their local veterans as well as promote awareness regarding war-associated illnesses. Background of the VFW The VFW is an establishment dedicated to helping veterans across the United States. According to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (2016), the VFW was founded when veterans of the Spanish-American War and the Philippine Insurrection wantedRead MoreLanguage Variation And Language Variations1596 Words   |  7 Pagesone of the important means that people used to establish and maintain relationships with other people (Wolfram, 2007). It is often that people talk differently when they are in various situations. They modify their way of speaking in order to adapt at matching their style as appropriate to the social settings. The various choices of speaking is known as ‘style’. According to Stockwell (2002), style is defined as variations within registers that can represent individual choices along social dimensionsRead MoreOcclusion the performance of the face recognition algorithms under occlusion is in general poor.700 Words   |  3 Pagesimages are different. Pose variation still presents a challenge for face recognition. Frontal training images have better performance to novel poses than do non-frontal training images. For a frontal training pose, can achieve reasonable recognition rates of above 90 percent. Illumination Pure illumination changes on the face are handled well by current face recognition algorithms. However, face recognition systems have difficulties in extreme illumination conditions in which significant parts of theRead MoreRacial And Ethnic Disparities Throughout Theu.s. Health Care1156 Words   |  5 PagesRacial and Ethnic Disparities in U.S. Health Care There continues to be racial and ethnic disparities in the United States, and these problems need to be addressed since the rate of racial/ethnic populations in the country are steadily rising. According to the 2001 United States Census, â€Å"racial/ethnic minority populations are growing at such a fast rate that by 2050 more than 50% of the population will belong to a minority group† (Weech-Maldonado, Al-Amin, Nishimi, Salam, 2011). Race and ethnicity

The Canadian Association Of Social Work - 1277 Words

In the profession of Social Work there are several policies, procedures, rules and guidelines that govern the way we make ethical decisions. Our job as Social Workers is to be knowledgeable of the professions needs and engage, assess, intervene, and evaluate with individuals, families and organizations in order to help them understand the value and importance of self-worth and self-determination when making decisions. The Canadian Association of Social Work (CASW) provides us with a Code of Ethics, which outlines the mission and values of the profession when dealing with ethical dilemmas. It creates a common framework for workers to develop approaches, understanding and boundaries to follow when working with clients (CASW, 2005). From†¦show more content†¦Being integrated with Social Work allows you to separate the cause and effect factors when counseling and helping clients through a broad range of situations. Your ethical behavior within the practice strives from your individual commitment to engage within the ethical practice (CASW, 2005). Generally speaking, you are working in the Child Protection department at the Children Aid’s Society when you are contacted by the school board regarding a 7-year-old girl named Anna. You have now been seeing Anna for six weeks, once a week. She has been sexually abused and this was verified by a medical examination, however, she has not disclosed who the perpetrator is. Despite no disclosure, the school and the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto speculate it is her mother’s boyfriend and the boyfriend still has access to her. The more time you spend with her the more she opens up to you. You feel she is getting closer to disclosing who the perpetrator is. During a session, she tells you that she has a â€Å"secret† she wants to tell you about â€Å"the bad man that hurt her† but she asks you to promise her first that you won’t tell anyone and if you can promise her that she will not tell you her â€Å"secret.† Building rapport and trustful relationships with clients is important to pull out aspects of situations that may otherwise be difficult to find, and help guide the dilemma accordingly based on the facts of the case. Social Workers have a

Communication and Language Immigration Challenge †Free Samples

Question: Discuss about the Communication and Language Immigration Challenge. Answer: Introduction: Australia was the first country in the entire world to have established a department specifically meant for immigration back in 1945 (JuradoBrochmann, 2013). Millions of nurses have since then settled in Australia through migration program for skilled and family migrants and through humanitarian programs for refugees. It has since then evolved to the present day, nurses from especially developing countries around the world are migrating to developed countries mainly in search for what they call as greener pastier or in other terms, employment opportunities which are better. They are mostly nurses who are skilled or semi-skilled and looking for employment. Some also migrate due to political instability in their motherland to seek refuge in the neighboring countries. The main motive of this report is to evaluate the merits and demerits which come along with employing this nurses in hospitals and how the demerits can be solved. A Skilled worker can be defined in simple terms as a worker who has special training, knowledge and acquired ability in what they do. On the other hand, the term Migrant has no single universally agreed upon definition. According to McNamee, Pearson, Boer, and Palgrave (2015), a migrant is that person who owns a foreign citizenship or has moved to another country to stay temporarily or to settle for a long term. It generally means that a skilled migrant is that person who possesses a special knowledge in what he does and is based in a country which he is not a citizen. They moved to a foreign country to work specifically on their area of expertise. Benefits of Employing Migrant Nurses One of the main benefits of employing this nurses is that they provide cheap labor. Generally, economically stronger countries have greater job opportunities which attract foreign nurses to apply for this job. In the countries they come from, payment is always very low and therefore what they are being offered in the foreign countries is much more competitive as compared to what they can or get in their motherland (Tejada, Bhattacharya, KhadriaKuptsch, 2014). On the other hand what most of the companies offer them in the migrant country is obviously lesser than what they offer or could have offered to the domestic workers hence cheap labor. The other thing is that most of this nurses have been without a job in their motherland, this means they are desperate for money and they can settle for almost any amount offered to them as either salary or wages hence cheap labor (McNamee et al., 2014). In the long run, it helps the company to minimize its expenses thus leading to high profits wh ich can be plowed back into the business to expand its production. Another benefit the hospital can get from employing migrant nurses is ease of training facilities for the local or domestic workers. Training facilities are always very important to local workers or employees of a new organization (KellVogl, 2012). These training cost employer a lot of money to facilitate, as a result of this, they hire skilled migrant labors who are being paid a minimal amount of money and ask them to train others. It is important to note that skills are not only acquired through going to college or university. Foreign workers have versatile knowledge as compared to domestic workers, as a result employer get good talent at less expense. Hiring migrant nurses promotes diversity in an organization. Diversity is the difference in race, cultural differences, ethnicity and other social practices among people working together (Nohl, Schittenhelm, Schmidtke Weiss, 2014). It comes with a bunch of advantages to the hospital and employees too. Diversity in an organization develops a diverse experience among employees, it promotes learning, increases adaptability in an organization, increase productivity which is very essential to any sector, it promotes the hospital to offer range of services to different clients who might not have liked the hospitals services due to issues like language barrier, cultural differences, and difference in social practices between employees of an organization (Yeung, Brown Lee, 2012). All these advantages of diversity enable hospitals to boost its profits and return on investment management. The above advantages of employing migrant nurses clearly demonstrate that an organization can grow very fast and also make profits if they hire skilled migrants. The country also benefits indirectly as the growth of the companies increases its Gross Domestic Product in the international market. Disadvantages of Employing Migrant Nurses One of the disadvantages of employing migrant nurses is lack of commitment on their side. An employer invest on the employee in terms of organizing visa and how they settle, after a period of time they decide to quit due to an issue with being homesick and the employers investment goes in vain. Moreover, foreign workers will require longer holidays to travel back to their motherland and again to travel back (Nohl, Schittenhelm, Schmidtke Weiss, 2015). This time is essential to the company and it might cost it a lot in terms of customer relationship and profits. They might also be reluctant due to the fact that they feel to be working as the expatriate and hence cannot be fired easily. Another challenge of employing migrant nurses is the lack of lingua franca. Lingua franca simply means the common language (Yeung et al., 2012). The language barrier issue can be a great problem to organizations which hire skilled migrants, the nurses are skilled but there is always high possibility that they cannot speak the common language in the country they have been employed (Yeung et al., 2012). This forces the employer to invest in training this employee the common language as it will not only affect the employees confidence but also the organizations progress management. For example; a skilled migrant nurse can do the hospital work but it may be difficult to communicate with patients who are not able to express themselves in the language he or she understands. This means patients will not attend such hospital due to lack of the lingua franca thus leading to the downfall of the hospital. Risk Management of Migrant Nurses Whatever has its advantages must also have some challenges which come on board with it, the question is, how do you whether down the challenges if you have decided to employ migrant nurses? An employer needs to treat this nurses with dignity and without favor, once they feel they are being treated well, they will give back by being dedicated to doing their work promptly (Bauder, 2012). They will take most of their time trying to return the organization that favor and the more time they give dedicate in doing their work the more the organization benefits. A nurse, for example, will take his or her time to listen carefully to patients and provide them with the necessary services with honor, this will brighten the image of that hospital and attract more customers who will be flocking in thereby leading to it making more profits (Goldin, 2013). Employers should be very sensitive to the language barrier and invest in training the nurses employed. It may be costly but it will be a one-off training which when done will benefit the company (Yeung et al., 2012). Once employees are able to communicate in the language which is common in the country, they will gain confidence and do their work with ease avoiding the risk of being left out in terms of freedom of expression during group work. In the section of decision-making, an employer should involve this nurses in some decision making in order to build their confidence that they are also part of the company and their opinions are valued (Tejada et al,. 2013). They should be placed in departments where they work closely with the domestic workers to help them understand that they are not there to simply do specific duties which domestic workers are excluded from. When all this are practiced by the employer, they will realize the beauty in employing migrant nurses. They will work all heartedly to the hospital and the benefits of their dedication will grow the company to a higher level, increase profits and give a return on capital. Conclusion The issue of employing migrant nurses is not a new in hospitals, it has been practiced in Australia for decades since the number of graduate nurses within the country has always been low. Many hospitals are coming up due to demand but there is no manpower to fill the vacancies, this is a main reason why employing nurses on the 457 visa is still important and the government cannot remove those nurses once they are employed even if the law changes. Therefor an employer should not be worried about future change of laws, the country need these nurses more than ever. The human resource department should be trained on the features to look at when employing these workers in order to reduce some risk at the stage hiring (KellVogl, 2012). Having looked at the advantages which come along with hiring migrant nurses and also the challenges, it is crystal clear that employers should not be afraid of employing migrant nurses, they should simply find ways of handling the challenges which might come out of it as the benefits are much better. It will boost the hospitals growth and the countrys as a whole gross domestic product also goes high in the international market. References Ahsan, A., Abella, M., Beath, A. (2014). International Migration and Development in East Asia and the Pacific. Washington: World Bank Publications. Bauder, H. (2012). Immigration and settlement: Challenges, experiences, and opportunities. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc. Goldin, I. (2013). Divided nations: Why global governance is failing, and what we can do about it. Jurado, E., Brochmann, G. (2013). Europe's immigration challenge management: Reconciling work, welfare and mobility. London: I.B. Tauris. Kell, P., Vogl, G. (2012). International students in the Asia Pacific: Mobility, risks and global optimism. Dordrecht: Springer. McNamee, T., In Pearson, M., In Boer, W., Palgrave Connect (Online service). (2015). Africans investing in Africa. Nohl, A.-M., Schittenhelm, K., Schmidtke, O., Weiss, A. (2014). Work in transition: Cultural capital and highly skilled migrants' passages into the labour market. Tejada, G. G., Bhattacharya, U. K.,Khadria, B., In Kuptsch, C. (2014). Indian skilled migration and development: To Europe and back. Yeung, A. S., Brown, E. L., Lee, C. F. K. (2012). Communication and language: Surmounting barriers to cross-cultural understanding. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub. World migration 2008: Managing labour mobility in the evolving global economy. (2008). Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration.

Project Failure Deepwater Horizon and the Bp Oil Spill Essay Example

Project Failure: Deepwater Horizon and the Bp Oil Spill Essay Introduction The Deepwater Horizon rig sank on April 22, 2010, two days after the Macondo well blowout and explosion that killed 11 workers. The Deepwater Horizon accident, also known as the BP Oil Spill, was a project failure of immense proportions. It went from an oil exploration â€Å"project† to a massive program with portfolios of projects related to dealing with the families of those killed on the oil rig, stopping the oil leak, capturing the oil (from the well and from the ocean), cleaning the environment (seashores, wetlands, Gulf of Mexico), saving and cleaning wildlife (underwater and on shores), responding to human needs (fishermen, economically impacted families), dealing with the public (PR campaigns), dealing with shareholders and employees, and dealing with governments(state and federal). The mission and scope changed and grew significantly over night. It changed from a $500 million oil prospect development project to over a $100 billion program with global reach and hundreds of projects. In addition, the inability of BP to stop the flow in a timely manner, communication problems by BP management, and long lasting negative media coverage of the slow reaction to the spill have resulted in serious negative consequences for BP, subcontractors on the project and the oil exploration industry as a whole. Additionally, the US federal government responded to the accident with poor organization and leadership. We will write a custom essay sample on Project Failure: Deepwater Horizon and the Bp Oil Spill specifically for you for only $16.38 $13.9/page Order now We will write a custom essay sample on Project Failure: Deepwater Horizon and the Bp Oil Spill specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer We will write a custom essay sample on Project Failure: Deepwater Horizon and the Bp Oil Spill specifically for you FOR ONLY $16.38 $13.9/page Hire Writer Analyzing the chain of events, some of the lessons from the failure become very apparent including the facts that BP and Transocean risk management plans were inadequate, BP was not prepared for the accident (or any accident for the most part), project management mistakes were made during drilling of the well, communication blunders were made by BP executives following the accident, the impact on the environment and stakeholders were underestimated, and the future of a company can be at risk from a critical failure of this magnitude. The DeepWater incident was largely a result of poor initial project planning, inadequate project risk management, poor project management execution including decision making and communication, and unprepared crisis management on the part of BP and the US government in the event of project failure. This paper will analyze the series of events leading up to the April 20, 2011, disaster, the decisions and lack of actions which compounded the possibility and severity of project failure and the mishandling of the crisis that ensued after the failure of the well. Background On March 19, 2008, BP acquired the federal lease for Mississippi Canyon Block 252, located in 4,992 feet of water 50 miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana for just over $34 Million from the Minerals Management Service (MMS). BP was highly confident in the seismic data and the presence of oil that the company proceeded to implement the project of drilling a $100 Million well named, Macondo. BP hired Transocean to supply the crew and the oil drilling rig to drill the well. On October 7, 2009, drilling began on the Macondo well using Transocean’s Marianas semisubmersible oil rig. The Marianas operated to a depth of 4,023 feet below the mudline, or 9,000 feet below sea level before it was damaged on November 9, 2009, by Hurricane Ida. Work on the Macondo well was suspended until January 31, 2010, when the Deepwater Horizon rig was delivered to the site. The Deepwater Horizon was a 33,000 ton semisubmersible oil rig which was controlled by a satellite guided dynamic positioning system and had a series of thrusters to keep it afloat. The Deepwater rig was extremely technologically advanced and viewed by many in the oil industry as having superior technology that was foolproof to error. On February 8, 2010, the Deepwater crew placed a blowout preventer on the well in 5,067 feet of water and used remotely operated vehicles to guide the preventer to the latching collet on the well head using video feeds. Once the preventer was latched up, the riser was hung in the tensioning system, the other necessary lines were hung, and the drilling commenced on the well. Research now shows that over the ensuing next three months, the Macondo well had multiple incidents of trouble which continued until the disastrous day when the well blew out and went out of control. During the early drilling in shallow depths, the crew experienced multiple well problems, gas kicks, and dangerous lost circulation zones-sometimes all at once. On four occasions prior to the blowout, the crew experienced well-control events. During one of the well-control problems, a drill pipe became stuck and could not move in or out of the hole. A stuck pipe can be very dangerous and is indicative of poor well hole conditions. After fighting the stuck pipe for a week, the crew separated the pipe from the assembly and placed a cement cap plug on it and continued to drill a sidetrack hole at 17,500 feet. As the days wore on, the crew became wary after experiencing multiple kicks, lost circulation, and stuck pipe to the point that Mike Williams testified to the Joint Investigation Committee in July 2010 that the crew had been calling it the â€Å"Well from Hell†. (In Too Deep pg25) After weeks of battling the well, the well reached its total depth of over 18,200 feet and the engineers ran measurements to analyze the subsurface intervals, their content, and their pressures. These measurements were used to make the decision to run pipe to the bottom of the well and to prepare the well for temporary abandonment prior to production. At this point, the engineers may have made a mistake which contributed to the well blow out. BP engineers decided to run one long string of casing from the bottom of the well all the way to the wellhead. This decision resulted in the only protection provided for the flow of oil and gas in to the wellbore was the cement that would be pumped down the casing and capped with a seal assembly at the well head. If the cement failed, the oil and gas could travel up the pipe to the well head and escape uncontrolled. BP chose a cementing design which had one avenue of protection through a single cap as opposed to other designs that had multiple layers cementing and caps which provided additional protection in case of well failure. By choosing this single cap well design, the BP engineers knowingly chose a less safe design and their managers willingly approved the decision. Haliburton was the cementing servicing company hired by BP to cement the well and attach the seal assembly to cap off the well until a new rig was connected to initial actual oil production. Haliburton supplied the cement used in the sealing of the well which is now known to have been of inferior quality. According to the BP team’s plan, if the cementing went smoothly, Haliburton could skip a scheduled cement evaluation. Planning The project plan for the Macondo well should have been one unique to the well itself. The research of the Deepwater incident indicates that the plan for the well was changed on multiple occasions and management seemed to be influencing decisions based on financial and schedule implications rather that the risk implications the decisions might present. Additionally, the lack of a clear project plan resulted in a poor organizational structure and accountability of the multiple subcontractors involved with the project. There were numerous occasions in which the crew of the Deepwater which was comprised of employees from BP, Transocean and Haliburton were unsure of which company was in charge at different points of the project. The lack of planning was even more evident within the issues of the inadequate risk planning and the execution problems that contributed to the failure of the project. As a result of the failure, a disaster comprised of death and monumental environmental damage was poorly addressed in that crisis management planning had not been addressed in the planning for the project as well. The crisis to contain the well itself would have been more readily addressed by BP had the company anticipated a blowout as a possible risk and therefore had a crisis management plan which had been communicated to all of its crew members. Instead the crisis itself is a First, on April 20, the oil and gas industry was unprepared to respond to a deepwater blowout, and the federal government was similarly unprepared to provide meaningful supervision. Second, in a compressed timeframe, BP was able to design, build, and use new containment technologies, while the federal government was able to develop effective oversight capacity. Both industry and government must build on knowledge acquired during the Deepwater Horizon spill to ensure that such a failure of planning does not recur Planning is even more important during a crisis. Such projects can be described as turnaround projects, where every minute is critical. Turnaround projects are often planned for months in advance, scheduled in minutes, with a well defined set of actions which are constantly monitored, and everyone prepared in advance for everything they need to do. BP and its subcontractors did not use their initial planning to develop disaster response or recovery plans. Without this type of planning built into the initial framework, time and lives can be lost when a company is forced to react to a disaster such as the Deepwater. ttp://www. oilspillcommission. gov/sites/default/files/documents/C21462-408_CCR_for_web_0. pdf Execution Failure The lack of a clear, unique plan for the Macondo project exacerbated the likelihood of problems during the execution of the drilling of the well. Additionally, Deepwater rig had several players involved with the project which resulted in a complex interrelationship among several companies all of whom had differ ent roles and conflicting interpretations of their accountability and responsibilities. Transocean was the owner and responsible for running the rig. Haliburton was a servicing subcontractor who was responsible for cementing the well. BP was lease owner and operator of the Macondo well and in that capacity had both the overall responsibility for everything that went on including promoting a culture of safety on the rig. BP’s safety culture failed on the night of April 20, 2010, as reflected in the actions of BP personnel on- and offshore and in the actions of BP’s contractors Research prior to April 20 shows that most crew members felt that safety was not a priority for BP or any of the other contractors on the rig. A survey during the second week of March showed that 46 percent of crew members surveyed felt that crewmembers feared reprisals for reporting unsafe situations and 15 percent felt that there were not always enough people available to carry out work safely. This extensive involvement of these contractors underscored the compelling need for BP to properly communicate a clear decision making process as well as emphasize safety. This poor safety culture was also evident in the meeting the day before the Deepwater accident in which the Transocean managers discussed with their BP counterparts the backlog of rig maintenance. A September 2009 BP safety audit had produced a 30-page list of 390 items requiring 3,545 man-hours of work. The lack of a safety culture may have contributed to the fact that BP, Halliburton, and Transocean did not adequately identify or address risks of an accident—not in the well design, cementing, or temporary abandonment procedures. Their management systems were marked by poor communications among BP, Transocean, and Halliburton employees regarding the risks associated with decisions being made. The decision making process on the rig was excessively compartmentalized, so individuals on the rig frequently made critical decisions without fully appreciating just how essential the decisions were to well safety—singly and in combination. As a result, officials made a series of decisions that saved BP, Halliburton, and Transocean time and money—but without full appreciation of the associated risks. There were several causes for execution failure that were identified after the accident. First, the cement that BP and Halliburton pumped into to the bottom of the well did not seal off hydrocarbons in the well. This was caused by the engineers changing the plans for the cement job during the effort due to drilling complications that were encountered. As a result, the engineers approved a lower volume of cement to be used in the process. This lower amount of cement resulted in the well not being sealed with a proper amount of cement weight. Second, the cement slurry used in the sealing of the well was poorly designed. Halliburton’s own internal tests showed that the cement mixture was unstable but the company still used the mixture on the Deepwater well. Lastly, the temporary abandonment procedures for the well were finalized at the last minute by BP and required the crew to severely underbalance the well before installing any additional barriers to back up the cement job. Risk Management BP failed to analyze the risk possibilities and plan risk mitigation strategies for the Macondo project. This lack of risk planning and mitigation can be attributed to several factors including: a bias in the oil industry itself which dismissed the possibility of a disaster as monumental as the Deepwater Horizon, a BP management culture which stressed cost savings and time savings in decision making, and a lack of a detailed crisis management plan in an industry whose failures can be monumental. Risk Management and the Oil Industry Bias The Deepwater incident has resulted in a dramatic reassessment of the risks associated with offshore drilling. Before April 20, many in the oil industry felt that drilling was safer in deep than in shallow waters. Since deepwater rigs worked farther off the coast, it would take longer for spilt oil to reach shore, giving more time for intervention to protect the coast. Also, the companies working in the deeper waters were typically the â€Å"big guys† of the oil industry who could afford to utilize more advanced technologies than the smaller firms working near the coast. Therefore, many believed that these companies were more adept at handling challenging conditions with the more technologically advanced equipment. Additionally, there had been no major well blowouts in federal offshore waters since 1970, which made the chances of another one seem remote. Another problem for appropriate risk assessment was the failure to adequately consider published data on recurring problems in offshore drilling. This included powerful â€Å"kicks† of unexpected pressures that sometimes led to a loss of well control, failing blowout preventer systems, and the drilling of relief wells. These problems occurred rarely and were of minor consequence relative to the number of wells in the world. However, these issues demonstrated that wells do not perform in a flawless manner and must be assessed for in risk planning. Additionally, working in the deeper depths of the ocean posed a numerous problems after a loss of well control or a blow out due to failure of the blow out preventer. Before the Deepwater accident, little attention was devoted to containment of a blown out well in the deepwater, largely because its occurrence was considered so unlikely. Therefore, many of the same technologies used for the blow out preventers in shallow water drilling were used in deepwater drilling with little innovation. That is despite the fact that containment problems become much more challenging and real-time decisions become more difficult when working in extreme depths of the ocean. Connecting and maintaining blowout preventers thousands of feet beneath the surface can only be performed by remote-operating vehicles. â€Å"A 2007 article in Drilling Contractor described how blowout preventer requirements got tougher as drilling went deeper, because of low temperatures and high pressures at the ocean bottom. The author discussed taking advantage of advances in metallurgy to use higher-strength materials in the blowout preventers’ ram connecting rods or ram-shafts. More generally, he suggested â€Å"some fundamental paradigm shifts† were needed across a broad range of blowout-preventer technologies to deal with deepwater conditions. † Page 51 pres book All things considered, the oil industry itself was overconfident and somewhat negligent in assessing the need for comprehensive and detailed risk management planning that addressed all facets of possibilities of failure within an oil well. Instead, the industry disregarded many of the possibilities as impossibilities despite the contrary research. This widespread view among the oil industry was reflected in the culture of the BP management and may have influenced some of appeasement with the lack of planning on the Macondo project. Risk Management and Decision Making BP had a tarnished reputation for safety. Among other BP accidents, 15 workers died in a 2005 explosion at its Texas City, Texas, refinery. In 2006, there was a major oil spill from a badly corroded BP pipeline in Alaska. As of April 20, BP and the Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget. BP did not adequately identify or address risks created by last-minute changes to well design and procedures. BP changed its plans repeatedly and up to the very last minute, sometimes causing confusion and frustration among BP employees and rig personnel. ? When BP did send instructions and procedures to rig personnel, it often provided inadequate detail and guidance. ? It is common in the offshore oil industry to focus on increasing efficiency to save rig time and associated costs. But management processes must ensure that measures taken to save time and reduce costs do not adversely affect overall risk. BP‘s management processes did not do so. ? Halliburton appears to have done little to supervise the work of its key cementing personnel and does not appear to have meaningfully reviewed data that should have prompted it to redesign the Macondo cement slurry. ? Transocean did not adequately train its employees in emergency procedures and kick detection, and did not inform them of crucial lessons learned from a similar and recent near-miss drilling incident When the BP engineers were faced with making a decision on the well design, they chose a design with one preventative layer. If the engineers would have put more credence into the high risks associated with deep well drilling, they may have picked a design which encompassed risk mitigation of several layers which prepared for failure. Additionally, by not really putting credence into the possibility of a well blowout, the engineers and BP management negated risk planning for the possibility of the environmental amage which could be caused by such a sizeable well having a blowout. In a case of an uncontrolled blowout, large volumes of oil and gas would be uncontrollably spewed into the environment. Transocean, for instance, was a major contractor for the Macondo well and is the world’s largest operator of offshore oil rigs, including the Deepwater Horizon; Transocean personnel made up the largest number of crew members on the rig at the time of the accident, and 9 of the 11 men who died on April 20 worked for the company. number of the mistakes made on the rig can be directly traced to Transocean personnel, including inadequate monitoring of the Macondo well for problems during the temporary abandonment procedures and failure to divert the mud and gas away from the rig during the first few minutes of the blowout. Project Crisis Management The effort and resources needed to contain and control the blowout of the Macondo well were unprecedented. From April 20, 2010, the day the well blew out, until September 19, 2010, when the government finally declared it dead, BP expended enormous resources to develop and deploy new technologies that eventually captured a substantial amount of oil at the wellhead and, after 87 days, stopped the flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The government organized a team of scientists and engineers, who took a crash course in petroleum engineering and, over time, were able to provide oversight of BP, in combination with the Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service (MMS). BP had to construct novel devices, and the government had to mobilize personnel on the fly, because neither was ready for a disaster of this nature in such ocean depths. BP initially underestimated the scale of the disaster and overestimated their ability to address it. Therefore, there was little action in the days following the accident that resembled crisis management. Two days after the explosion, BP had mobilized a mere 32 vessels and 4 aircraft. To be in full response capacity, BP needed 205 times the number of vessels and 32 times the number of aircraft initially deployed. It took until nearly Day 80 before BP was a full response capacity. http://strategicppm. wordpress. com/2010/08/03/bps-project-management-of-the-deepwater-disaster/ This understated reaction was driven by the belief that the well was only leaking 5,000 barrels a day. In reality, the well was leaking ten times that amount. At day 31, the government established a public underwater feed and panel of experts to analyze the flow rate. This resulted in all parties becoming fully aware as of the amount of oil leaking from the well and the response effort of BP and the US government continued to increase. BP immediately focused on repairing the failed the blowout preventer for the first ten days after the explosion. BP did not have planned alternatives to address the incident of a blown out well. Therefore, when the blowout preventer could not be repaired, BP had to develop alternate solutions. These solutions were explored sequentially,  rather than in parallel, which caused further delay. The exception to that was the digging of relief wells which take several months to complete. BP did not have any alternate solutions prepared and developed in advance to be deployed immediately during a time of crisis. The facts indicate that BP didn’t understand (or didn’t want to understand) the scale of the project it was involved in. Government Response Failure The failure of the US federal government to react to the Deepwater disaster is comprised of two components- pre-disaster regulatory efforts and post disaster readiness and response preparedness. First, the government organizations which were tasked to regulate the oil industry for safety compliance were not doing their jobs. The Minerals Management Service (MMS) was responsible for approving the disaster plans of the oil companies as well as regulating their actions in the environment with the Environmental Protection Agency. It is now evident that MMS failed miserably in the oversight of the offshore oil industry. The agency’s resources did not keep pace with the oil industry’s expansion into deeper waters and reliance on more demanding technologies. As a result, MMS was not familiar with many of the technologies presented by oil companies and as a result it frequently relented to a lower number of required tests including testing on blow out preventers. Ironically, BP did have an Oil Spill Response Plan for the Gulf of Mexico applicable to the Macondo well in the MMSfiles. The plan identified three different worst-case scenarios that ranged from 28,033 to 250,000 barrels of oil discharge and used identical language to analyze the shoreline impacts under each scenario. Five of the pages were copied from material on NOAA websites and as a result were not specific to the Gulf of Mexico region. As a result, the BP Oil Spill Response Plan described biological resources nonexistent in the Gulf—including sea lions, sea otters, and walruses. Even more troubling, the MMS Gulf of Mexico Regional Office approved the BP plan without additional analysis. There is little evidence that MMS or BP gave any scrutiny to the contents of the Oil Spill Response Plan submitted. However, the MMS Regional Office did adhere to the timeline to review and approve oil-spill response plans within 30 days of their receipt. This lack of emphasis on the content of the response plan surely contributed to the lack of planning on both the part of the government and BP. As a result, when the disaster struck the MMS and the US federal government reacted slowly to the event. For the first couple of weeks the government barely reacted as it thought BP was more prepared and capable to deal with the spill. When it became evident that BP was coming up with solutions on a day to day basis, the government became more involved with the process. MMS was disbanded 19 days into the disaster. The government continued to work with BP and the other parties to find solutions to killing the well as well as manage the economic impact the disaster was having on the Gulf states. All in all it can be assessed that the US federal government was even less prepared than BP itself. Conclusion Based on the mindset and common practices, it was only a matter of time for this kind of accident to occur within the oil industry. An accident, and certainly any disaster, can be considered as a disruptive event. After a disruptive event, anything and everything can change, with serious repercussions. Many disruptive events can be both predicted and planned for. This should be a major element of the risk planning associated with major programs and projects. And disruptive events can have unexpected and significant consequences – in this case, enormous impact on the environment, BP market valuation, BP’s public image and credibility, many other BP projects and people, public perception of both BP and the oil industry itself, and possibly BP survival. The lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon project disaster and the BP Oil Spill will continue to influence the regulation of the oil industry into the future. BP learned that adequate project planning and risk management analysis is essential in the event of a project failure. Additionally, a crisis management plan for an unplanned disaster should always be in place prior to any possibility of occurrence. BP’s $500 million oil prospect development project became a crisis management project which has cost over $100 billion to date. BP will continue to struggle with its public relations image as well as continue to deal with endless lawsuits and environmental and economic claims into the future. BP’s lack of planning, lack of risk management analysis and lack of a crisis management plan in the face of project failure could have resulted in the demise of the company altogether. The Deepwater incident will continue to serve as an example to project managers everywhere that the basic concepts of project management should never be neglected, even when you are one of the largest companies in the world. - Bibliography â€Å"BP’s Project Management of the  Deepwater  Disaster† StrategicPPM. com. 3 August 2010. 28 May 2011 http://strategicppm. wordpress. com/2010/08/03/bps-project-management-of-the-deepwater-disaster/ Cavnar, Bob. Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the Story Behind the Deepwater Well Blowout. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2010. Kuzmeski, Maribeth. â€Å"Pinpointing BP’s Pitfalls: Eight Ways to Reconnect After a Disaster† PM World Today, Vol. XII Issue VII July 2010. 28 May 2011 http://www. pmworldtoday. net/tips/2010/july/Pinpointing-BP-Pitfalls. html Lepsinger, Rick. â€Å"Execution Meltdown: Four Key Failures That Sank BP. † . † PM World Today, Vol. XII Issue VIII August 2010. 28 May 2011 http://www. pmworldtoday. net/tips/2010/aug/Execution-Meltdown. html Maltzman, Rich, et al. â€Å"Green Project Management and the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill. † PM World Today, Vol. XII Issue IX- September 2010. 28 May